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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 92-0259

v.
ANN L. WASSERMAN, SHIRLEY
RANDAZZO, AND THE HONORABLE
MICHAEL MURPHY,

Priority No. 16

Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE MICHAEL MURPHY

JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3) (j).

This appeal may be transferred to the Court of Appeals

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal seeks the reversal of a Summary Judgment entered
in favor of Judge Murphy on April 5, 1991. The material findings
of fact set forth in the Summary Judgment are not in dispute.
Rather, Plaintiff challenges the trial court's conclusions of law
regarding each of the following issues:
1.

Whether Plaintiff waived the procedural due process

rights which are the basis of this action.
2.

Whether Plaintiff's claims against Judge Murphy are

barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.

3.

Whether this action is barred by the doctrine of res

judicata.
Summary judgment is proper if no genuine issue of material
fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power &

Water, Inc. , 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990). This Court reviews the lower
court's conclusions of law for correctness, according no particular
deference to the lower court. CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists,
Inc.. 772 P.2d 967 (Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 7.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of a Summary Judgment granted in favor of
Judge Murphy on April 5, 1991.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff is a member of the Utah State Bar.

Plaintiff

formerly represented Frank Randazzo in a divorce action entitled
2

Randazzo v. Randazzo, Third District Court Case No. D-88-4130 ("the
divorce action").
2.
Bar.

Defendant Wasserman is also a member of the Utah State

Defendant Wasserman represented Ms. Randazzo in the divorce

action.
3.

Defendant Murphy ("Judge Murphy") is a duly appointed

judge of the Third Judicial District Court. Judge Murphy presided
over the divorce action.
4.

The divorce action was tried on August 1, 1989.

The

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce
were signed by Judge Murphy on September 6, and entered on that
same date.
5.
Counsel.

Also on September 6, Plaintiff filed a Withdrawal of
The Withdrawal of Counsel indicated that a hearing to

determine whether Mr. Randazzo should be held in contempt had been
set for September 13. Addendum, Exhibit "A".
6.

On September 13, although the hearing was scheduled to

begin at 3:00 pm, neither Mr. Randazzo nor Plaintiff appeared. At
Judge Murphy's request, Mr. Randazzo was telephonically contacted
by

Judge

Murphy's

clerk

and

appeared

without

counsel

at

approximately 4:30 pm. R. at 82. Mr. Randazzo represented that he
had not received a copy of the Withdrawal and Counsel and was
unaware of the hearing.

R. at 82. Judge Murphy declined to hold

Mr. Randazzo in contempt, but awarded Ms. Randazzo $430 for her
attorney's fees in bringing the contempt matter before the court,
and instructed Mr. Randazzo as follows:
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THE COURT: Let me tell you what you are going
to do. Before you pay Mr. Barnard one dime
more, you will pay to Ms. Wasserman for her
fees in regard to this hearing $430, which
will be, in my mind, — listen to me, Mr.
Randazzo — a direct credit for the amounts
that you owe Mr. Barnard.
My understanding of what has occurred here as
a result of Mr. Barnard's withdrawal, and
based on your representations to me, and at
least some verification that I've seen of this
transcript and when it was mailed, this is not
entirely your fault, Mr. Randazzo.
And I think that neither you nor Ms. Randazzo
should be out of Ms. Randazzo's attorney's
fees, and the only way I know of rectifying
that is by having Mr. Barnard pay Ms.
Wasserman's fees in the manner in which I
indicated.
R. at 92.
7.

On September 18, in response to the proposed order,

Plaintiff filed an Affidavit setting forth his communications with
Mr. Randazzo up until the date of his withdrawal. R. at 114 - 118;
Addendum, Exhibit "B».
8.

On September 20, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate Order

of Sanctions and Objection to Order, claiming that he had been
deprived of his constitutional due process rights because Judge
Murphy had not provided him with notice and an opportunity to be
heard.
9.

R. at 111 - 113; Addendum, Exhibit "C".
On September 21, Plaintiff filed a Request for Hearing on

his Motion.
10.

R. at 119, 120; Addendum, Exhibit "D".

Judge Murphy signed the order arising from the September

13 hearing on October 12. R. at 138 - 140; Addendum, Exhibit "E".
However, he instructed his clerk not to enter the order until
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Plaintiff had an opportunity to have a hearing on the attorney's
fee issue.
11.

On November 14, Plaintiff represented to Judge Murphy's

clerk that he did not intend to have a hearing. Consequently, the
clerk created a minute entry and entered the order on that same
date.

R. at 137A, 138; Addendum, Exhibit ,fF".
12.

On November 21, while appearing in Ward v. Butcher, Third

District Court Case No. C-88-4883, Plaintiff testified that he had
spoken with Judge Murphy's clerk about the order and that he told
her, "Go ahead and file it. I'll take care of it in another way."
R. at 130.
13.

Plaintiff

then

filed

a

civil

rights

suit

against

Defendants Randazzo, Wasserman and Murphy in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah ("the federal action"). On
May 9, 1990, the federal action was dismissed by Judge Clarence
Brimmer for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and because of
judicial immunity.
14.

R. at 142 - 150; Addendum, Exhibit "G".

Plaintiff then filed this suit, alleging the same cause

of action raised in the federal action.
15.

Defendant Murphy filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,

which was granted by Judge Pat B. Brian on April 5, 1991.

R. at

345 - 358; Addendum, Exhibit "H". After the matter was concluded
as to the other defendants, Plaintiff filed this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The present claims against Judge Murphy are barred by the
doctrines

of

waiver,

judicial

5

immunity,

and

res

judicata.

Consequently, the Summary Judgment, granted on each of those three
grounds, should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE — PLAINTIFF WAIVED HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
BY FAILING TO PURSUE RELIEF FROM THE ORDER
IN THE DIVORCE ACTION
Although

there

is

a

presumption

against

waivers

of

constitutional rights, the presumption can be overcome by a showing
of a valid waiver.

Pitts v. Bd. of Education, 869 F.2d 555, 557

(10th Cir. 1989).

The test is whether the totality of the

circumstances

indicates

an

intentional

abandonment

or

relinquishment of a known constitutional right. Johnson v. Zerbst.
304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938); Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S.
477, 101A S.Ct. 1880 (1981).
In this matter, Plaintiff's complaint claims that Judge
Murphy's order deprived him of his constitutional right to be heard
on the issue of payment of attorney's fees by Mr. Randazzo.
Plaintiff is a licensed attorney, and is familiar with the process
for objecting to proposed court orders.

In fact, Plaintiff filed

a Motion to Vacate Order of Sanctions and Objection to Order, and
a Request for Hearing, in an initial attempt to obtain relief from
the order.

However, he later intentionally abandoned the process

by informing Judge Murphy's clerk that he did not wish to have a
hearing because he would "take care of it in another way." He knew
the consequences of that statement when he made it.

He knowingly

and voluntarily determined to forego his right to a hearing in the
divorce action in order to challenge the order in federal court.
6

His actions resulted in a valid waiver of the right he claims was
denied him by Judge Murphy, and a civil rights complaint to remedy
the loss of that right cannot therefore stand.

Weinrauch v. Park

City, 751 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1984); Riaains v. Bd. of Regents of
University of Nebraska, 790 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1986).
POINT TWO — PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST JUDGE MURPHY
ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
It is a well established principle of our judicial system that
judges are immune from liability for acts committed in their
judicial capacities.

Although judicial immunity is not absolute,

a judge is entitled to immunity if he has not acted in clear
absence of all jurisdiction and if the act is a judicial one.
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (1978).

An act is

"judicial" if it is a function normally performed by a judge and if
the parties

dealt with the judge

in his

official capacity.

Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985).
The injury complained of by Plaintiff arises from Judge
Murphy's decision in a post-trial contempt proceeding.

Presiding

over such proceedings, making oral rulings, granting attorney's
fees in such proceedings, and signing orders, are all actions
consistent with the conduct normally engaged in by district court
judges of this state.

Judge Murphy was acting in his official

capacity when he engaged in each of the specified actions.
As noted by Plaintiff, judicial immunity is not a bar to
prospective injunctive relief.
104A S.Ct. 1970 (1984).

Pulliam v. Allenr 466 U.S. 522,

Unlike the plaintiffs in Pulliam however,

Plaintiff here is seeking to change a previously entered court
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order, not enjoin the entry of such orders in the future.

In

Navaio Nation v. District Court for Utah County, 624 F.Supp. 130
(D. Utah 1985), Judge Greene granted summary judgment in favor of
the state district court, holding that the plaintiffs7 action was
barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.

He stated:

Although the United States Supreme Court
recently found that judicial immunity is not a
bar to prospective injunctive relief against a
judicial officer, nor to the award of
attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in
cases where prospective injunctive relief is
granted, the question presented here is
whether
this
case
is
appropriate
for
collateral prospective relief.
Unlike the
respondents in Pulliam,
who sought to enjoin a
Magistrate
from
requiring
bond
for a
nonincarcerable offense, the plaintiffs in
[t]his case do not seek the prospective
enjoining of an ongoing unconstitutional
practice, but rather seek to reverse a final
judgment which resulted from evidentiary
hearings in a specific case. The plaintiffs'
request is more in the nature of appellate
review
of
the
State
Court
decision.
Therefore, this Court finds that the narrow
exception to the doctrine of judicial immunity
as articulated in the Pulliam
decision does
not apply . . . . Citations omitted.
624 F.Supp. at 137.
Plaintiff here, like the plaintiffs in Navaio Nation, attempts
to come within the Pulliam exception, but in reality, only seeks
the reversal of Judge Murphy's order. Such relief is barred by the
doctrine of judicial immunity.
POINT THREE — PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST JUDGE MURPHY
ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
In Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988), this
Court explained the issue preclusion branch of res judicata as
follows:
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Under the rules of issue preclusion, the
adjudication of an issue bars its relitigation
in another action only if four requirements
are met. First, the issue in both cases must
be identical. Second, the judgment must be
final with respect to that issue. Third, the
issue must have been fully, fairly, and
competently litigated in the first action.
Fourth, the party who is precluded from
litigating the issue must be either a party to
the first action or a privy of a party.
In the present case, as in the federal action, the issue of
judicial immunity was raised, briefed, argued and submitted to the
court for decision, and the dismissal of the federal action was
final with respect to that issue.

The district court found that

the relief sought by Plaintiff was "clearly retroactive and not
prospective," and was therefore barred by the doctrine of judicial
immunity.

This action is therefore barred by res judicata.
CONCLUSION

Defendant

Murphy

respectfully

submits

that

the

Summary

Judgment should be affirmed.

DATED this 2d day of October, 1992.

Colin R. Winchester
Counsel for Appellee Murphy

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 2d day of October, 1992, I handdelivered four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee Murphy to each of the following:
Brian M. Barnard, Esq,
Utah Legal Clinic
214 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204
Ann L. Wasserman, Esq.
Littlefield and Peterson
426 South 800 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Colin R. Winchester
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Affidavit of Brian M. Barnard (divorce
action)

Exhibit »C"

Motion To Vacate Order of Sanctions and
Objection to Order (divorce action)

Exhibit "D"

Request for Hearing (divorce action)

Exhibit "E"

Order (divorce action)

Exhibit

Minute Entry (divorce action)

u p it

Exhibit »G"

Order on Motions for Summary Judgment
(federal action)
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
Judgment and Order (state action)
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EXHIBIT "A
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB // 0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for FRANK A. RANDAZZO
Defendant
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Phone: (801) 328-9532

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

SHIRLEY N. RANDAZZO,

WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL
and NOTICE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 88-4904130 DA

FRANK A. RANDAZZO,
(Hon. M. MURPHY)
Defendant.

BRIAN M. BARNARD and C. DANE NOLAN of the Utah Legal
Clinic hereby withdrawal as counsel of record for the
defendant in the above captioned matter.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN to the defendant that there is a
hearing in this matter set for September 13, 1989 at the
hour of 3:00 p.m. before the Hon. Michael R. Murphy.
DATED this 5th day of September.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC

BRIAN M. BARNARD
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing VJITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL and NOTICE to:
ANN L. WASSERMANN
Attorney for Plaintiff
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

FRANK RANDAZZO
Defendant
6458 South 1140 West
Murray, Utah 84123
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service on the
5th day of SEPTEMBER, 1989.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC

FVWTPTT "P"
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB // 0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Former Attorney for FRANK A. RANDAZZO
Defendant
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Phone: (801) 328-9532
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
STATE OF UTAH

SHIRLEY N. RANDAZZO,

SALT LAKE COUNTY

AFFIDAVIT OF
BRIAN M. BARNARD

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 88-4904130 DA

FRANK A. RANDAZZO,
(Hon. M. MURPHY)
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

SS,
SALT*LAKE COUNTY
BRIAN M. BARNARD having been duly sworn upon oath
deposes and states as follows:

1.

I am the former counsel for the defendant in the

above captioned matter.

I am an attorney admitted to

practice in this Court.

""Hi

2.

During the afternoon of August 2, 1989, after the

oral ruling by the Court in this action, I had a telephone
conversation with the defendant Frank Randazzo.

In that

conversation I read him my notes from the courtfs ruling.
3.

In that phone conversation, I specifically told him

that he was obligated to bring current the indebtedness to
the Cyprus Credit Union and that he had to make the payment
due in late August.
4.

On August 7, 1989, I received a letter from plain-

tiff's counsel (a copy is attached).

On that date I mailed

a copy of that letter to the defendant Frank Randazzo at
6458 South 1140 West, Murray, Utah 84123.
that copy was a note to call me.

Included with

The defendant did not call

me in reponse to that note.
5.

On or about August 18, 1989, I received proposed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce in this matter from plaintiff's counsel.

On August

19, 1989 I mailed a copy of those pleadings to the defendant
Frank Randazzo at 6458 South 1140 West, Murray, Utah 84122.
Included with that copy was a note to review the documents
and to call me.

Defendant did not call me in response to

that note.
6.

After the oral ruling and decision in this matter,

I ordered a transcript of that ruling.

I received that from

this Courtfs stenographic reporter after August 18, 1989.

mil 1 x

On August 23, 1989, shortly after receipt, I mailed a cozy
of that transcript to the defendant at his Murray address.
7.

On or about September 1, 1989, I received an

Affidavit of Plaintiff, a Motion for Contempt and a Notice
of Hearing in this matter from plaintiff's counsel. On
September 1, 1989 I mailed a copy of those pleadings to the
defendant Frank Randazzo at his Murray address.

Included

with those copies was a note to review the documents and to
call me.
8.

On or about September 5, 1989 I received a phone

call from the defendant in which he acknowledged receipt of
the Motion for Contempt and accompanying documents. He
complained to me in that conversation about his wifefs
continuing refusal to deliver his property to him, her
recently taking his horse to a pasture three hundred (300
miles away, etc.

In that conversation I told him that r-.y

office could no longer represent him.
9.

In that September 5, 1989 conversation, I told hir.

that he had to appear on September 13, 1989 for the hearing;.
10.

On September 5, 1989 I prepared a withdrawal of

counsel and mailed it to the defendant at 6458 South 1140
West, Murray, Utah 84123.

Included in that withdrawal is a

notice of the hearing on September 13, 1989.

n!i1 1 ^

11.

Since May 2, 1989 the only home address that I

have had for the defendant is 6458 South 1140 West, Murray,
Utah 84123.
12.

Each of the documents as set forth above mailed to

the defendant was sent to the defendantfs Murray address
with sufficient postage.

None of the documents mailed as

set forth above have been returned to me by the Postal
Service.
DATED this 18th day of September, 1989.

BRIAN
Affiant
/

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME ON THE DATE ABOVE WRI7TE"

My ctotnm. expires:

mdh

Residing at Salt'Lake Cour.-v
STATE OF UTAH
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN M. BARNARD to:
ANN L. WASSERMANN
Attorney for Plaintiff
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

FRANK RANDAZZO
Defendant Pro Se
6458 South 1140 West
Murray, Utah
84123
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service cr. the
18th day of SEPTEMBER, 1989.
UTAH- LEGAL CLINIC

BRIAN M. (BARNARD
Former Attorney for Defendant
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Former Attorney for FRANK A. RANDAZZO
Defendant
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Telephone: (801) 328-9532 or 328-9532
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
)

\

0

STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE COUNTY

$

SHIRLEY N. RANDAZZO,
:
Plaintiff,

/foOTION TO VACATE
^RDER OF SANCTIONS
and
OBJECTION TO ORDER
Civil No. 88-4904130 DA

vs.
FRANK A. RANDAZZO,

(Hon. M. MURPHY)
Defendant.

BRIAN M. BARNARD former counsel for the defendant in
the above captioned matter objects and moves this Court as
follows:

1.

This Court ruled on September 13, 1989 that

sanctions should be imposed upon former counsel for the
defendant.
2.

Counsel for the plaintiff served upon former

counsel for the defendant a copy of the proposed order base
upon the hearing of September 13, 1989.

3.

The Court ruled and imposed sanctions without

notice to former counsel.
4.

The Court ruled and imposed sanctions without

allowing former counsel to present evidence or explain his
conduct.
5.

The Court ruled and imposed sanctions based on

false or incomplete information,
6.

This objection and motion are supported by the

Affidavit of Brian M. Barnard dated September 18, 1989 filed
herewith.
7.

Former counsel for the defendant gave notice to

defendant of the Courtfs ruling of August 2, 1989 in a
timely and appropriate manner.

Former counsel for the

defendant gave notice to defendant of his obligations based
upon the Court's ruling in a timely and appropriate manner.
8.

Entering an order of sanctions against former

counsel, without notice and without an opportunity to be
heard constitutes a deprivation of property and liberty
without due process.

. if 1 1 1 ~t

WHEREFORE, Brian M. Barnard objects to the proposed
order and imposition of sanctions against him and moves this
Court to vacate the oral ruling and not enter the proposed
order based upon that oral ruling.
DATED this 18th day of September, 1989.

BRIAN M.(BARNARD
Former Counsel for
Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing OBJECTION & MOTION TO VACATE to:
ANN L. WASSERMANN Attorney for Plaintiff
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102
FRANK RANDAZZO Defendant Pro Se
6458 South 1140 West
Murray, Utah

84123

postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service on the
18th day of SEPTEMBER, 1989.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC

'BRIAN M. BARNARD
Former At/torney for Defendant

CVTTTnTT
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:
BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB // 0215
- -^ttU. ^
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Former Attorney for FRANK A. RANDAZZO
Defendant
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Phone: (801) 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

SHIRLEY N. RANDAZZO,

REQUEST FOR HEARING

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 88-4904130 DA

vs.
FRANK A. RANDAZZO,

(Hon. M. MURPHY)

Defendant.

BRIAN M. BARNARD, former counsel for the defendant in
the above captioned matter hereby requests this court to set
for hearing the motion brought by Brian M. Barnard to vacate
the cftrder of sanctions entered against him and to set for
hearing Brian M. Barnard's objection to the proposed order
based on the hearing of September 13, 1989.
DATED this jfos—

day of September, 1989.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing REQUEST FOR HEARING to:
ANN L. WASSERMANN
Attorney for Plaintiff
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

FRANK RANDAZZO
Defendant Pro Se
6458 South 1140 West
Murray, Utah 84123
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service on the
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day of SEPTEMBER, 1989.
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ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
SHIRLEY N. RANDAZZO,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.
"N

FRANK A. RANDAZZO,

Case No. 884904130DA
Judge Michael R. Murphy

Defendant.
-ooOoo

Plaintiff's Motion for Finding of Contempt came on for
hearing on September 13, 1989, at the hour of 3:00 p.m., the
Honorable Michael R. Murphy presiding.

Plaintiff appeared in

person and was represented by counsel, Ann L. Wassermann, Esq.
initially, Defendant did not appear.

The Court made telephonic

contact with the Defendant, who subsequently appeared.
not represented by counsel.

He was

The Court having considered the

pleadings, the proffer of counsel for the Plaintiff, and the comments of the Defendant, and it appearing to the Court that the
Defendant did not receive notice of the hearing, and it further
appearing that Defendant's former counsel did not give Defendant

-1-

timely notice of the details of the Court's decision as announced
on August 2, 1989, and it further appearing that Defendant's
counsel did not forward to Defendant copies of the proposed
Findings of Fact and Decree of Divorce, and it further appearing
that the Defendant had made good faith efforts to comply with the
Court's orders upon learning of them,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1.

Plaintiff's Motion for Finding of Contempt is

2.

Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the Findings cf

denied.

Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce previously
entered in this matter to provide that Defendant shall be
required to reimburse her for all monies expended by her as a
result of Defendant's failure to comply with previous Court
orders requiring him to make payments to the credit union.

Those

amounts shall be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff on or before
December 13, 1989.
3.

Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $4 30.00

as and for attorney's fees incurred by Plaintiff in connection
with this contempt proceeding.

The Defendant is ordered not to

pay any money to his former counsel, Brian Barnard, until the
award of attorney's fees is paid to counsel for the Plaintiff.
Further, any monies paid by Defendant to counsel for Plaintiff in
satisfaction of this obligation shall be credited, dollar for

-2-
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dollar against Defendant's outstanding balance with his prior
counsel, Brian Barnard.
DATED this Jl/

day of September, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

HON. MICHAEL R. MURPHY/
District Court Judge

'

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order, this

IT
day of September,

1989.

to:
Mr. Frank Randazzo
6458 South 1140 West
Murray, Utah 84123
Mr. Brian M. Barnard, Esq.
Utah Legal Clinic
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

38336
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
RANDAZZO, SHIRLEY N
PLAINTIFF
VS
RANDAZZO, FRANK A

CASE'NUMBER 884904130 DA
DATE 11/14/89
HONORABLE MICHAEL R MURPHY
COURT- REPORTER
COURT CLERK MPB

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. WASSERMANN, ANN L.
D. ATTY. BARNARD, BRIAN M.

BASED ON REPRESENTATION OF DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL THAT HE DOES NOT
INTEND TO HAVE HEARING ON OBJECTIONS TO ORDER AND AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, THE ORDER AND FINDINGS
SIGNED OCTOBER 12, 1989 ARE FILED TODAY.
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FILED IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT DISTRICT Of in^

BY.
09»UTYCLBfc

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,
NO.

vs.

89-C-1042-B

UHi^^wi^ifi]

ANN L. WASSERMANN,
SHIRLEY RANDAZZO, and
THE HON- MICHAEL MURPHY,
Judge of the Third District
Court: in and for Salt Lake
Counry, State of Utah,

MAY - S 1990
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE COURTS

Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

This matter comes before the Court on the motion for judgment
on the pleadings of the plaintiff and on the motions for summary
judgment of defendants Ann L. Wasserman and Michael Murphy.

The

Courr, having reviewed the pleadings, having heard the arguments
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now FINDS and
ORDERS as follows:
Background
Plaintiff
Frank Randazzo

Brian M.

Barnard

in a divorce

is an

attorney

action tried

before

who

represented

the defendant,

Michael Murphy, Judge of the Third District Court in and for Salt
Lake County.

The defendant, Ann Wassermann, is an attorney who

represented

Shirley Randazzo in the divorce action.

Shirley

Randazzo is also named as a defendant in this action, and the Court
has entered default against her for her failure to answer the
complaint.
Frank Randazzo was required to make certain payments to
Shirley Randazzo pursuant to the divorce decree.

Those payments

were not made, and Shirley Randazzo moved to hold Frank Randazzo
in contempt.

Neither Frank Randazzo nor Barnard appeared at the

time set for the hearing on the motion September 13, 1989.
court noted that Barnard had withdrawn

as counsel

The

for Frank

Randazzo September 6, 1989, giving notice of that withdrawal to
Randazzo, to the Court, and to Wasserman. Randazzo appeared at the
hearing pro se an hour and thirty-five minutes late. Upon hearing
his

side

of

the

story,

Judqe

Murphy ordered

Randazzo

to pay any

attorney fees due Barnard to Wasserman.
The court ordered Wasserman to draw up an order reflecting its

THE COURT: Let me tell you what you are going
to do. Before you pay Mr. Barnard one dime
more, you will pay to Ms. Wassermam for her
feesin regard to this hearing^$430, which will
be, in my mind, ^— listen to m^&r^Kandazzo - a direct credit for the amounts that you owe
Mr. Barnard.
Randazzo v. Randazzo. No. 88-4904130DA, Sept. 13, 1989
at 29.
2
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decision, which Wasserman did.

She mailed a copy of the Order to

Barnard, and he filed his motion to vacate the sanctions and
objections to the order, along with an affidavit and a request for
a hearing, on September 20, 1989.

On November 21, 1989, at a

hearing in an unrelated matter in which Barnard represented one of
the parties, Judge Murphy inquired of Barnard whether he intended
to file suit against him, "because if I'm a party to a lawsuit like
that I don't see how I can sit on this case...11
No. C 88-448 3, Nov. 21, 1989, transcript at 2.

Ward v. Butcher,
Judge Murphy's

clerk was sworn and testified that she had called Barnard to ask
whether he wanted her to schedule a hearing on his objections. He
indicated to her that he did not, so she filed the Order imposing
sanctions, which she had been holding at Judge Murphy's direction.
Id. at 8.

Barnard was then sworn and testified that he had told

the clerk to "go ahead and file" the Order, because he intended to
either file a Writ of Mandamus in state court or file an action in
federal court.

Id. at 9.

The Order imposing sanctions upon Barnard was filed in the
Third Judicial District Court November 14, 1989.

On November 22,

1989, Barnard filed the complaint in this action, alleging that
defendants had deprived him of his constitutional rights and

3
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seeking damages

and

injunctive

and declaratory

relief.

The

complaint alleges that Judge Murphy, acting under color of state
law, deprived Barnard of his property and liberty interests without
due process of law, and that Wassennan acted in concert with him.
Barnard seeks judgment declaring the Order to be null and void and
unenforceable.

He further seeks damages from Wasserman, and

attorney fees and costs against all defendants.
Barnard now moves for judgment on the pleadings, and both
Murphy and Wasserman have moved for summary judgment.

Jurisdiction
This Court must first address the threshold question whether
it has jurisdiction in this case. The Tenth Circuit has held that
review of state court judgments in judicial proceedings may only
be had in the United States Supreme Court. Van Sickle v. Hollowav.
791 F.2d 1431, 1436 (10th Cir. 1986).

"Federal district courts do

not have jurisdiction 'over challenges to state-court decisions in
particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those
challenges

allege

unconstitutional.111

that

the

state

court's

action

was

Id. (quoting District of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983)).

4
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Defendants argue that Barnardfs § 1983 action is in fact a
challenge to a state court proceeding, and that this Court is
therefore without jurisdiction to hear it. They point to the fact
that part of the remedy sought by the plaintiff is declaratory or
injunctive relief voiding the Order entered in the Third Judicial
District Court of Utah.
Barnard contends this action is not an attempt to obtain
review of a state court decision in federal court. He argues that
he is only challenging the procedure by which the court deprived
him of his constitutional rights; he does not seek review of the
merits of that decision.

Therefore, Barnard reasons, this case

does not fall under the prohibition of Van Sickle and Feldman.
Barnard relies on Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429
(10th Cir. 1984), cert, denied. 471 U.S. 1016 (1985), to support
his argument.

In that case, the Tenth Circuit had before it a §

1983 action in which an attorney sought judgment declaring that
the Colorado procedure for disciplining attorneys violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id. at 143 0.

The

court held that it did have jurisdiction to hear that case because
it did not involve an attorney's challenge to particular discipline
imposed upon him, but a "generalized constitutional attack on the

5
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state's rules and regulations governing discipline.11

Id. at 1432.

The court relied on Feldman to make the distinction, holding that
11

in the latter kind of case, the district court is not required to

review a state court judicial decision but rather to assess the
validity of a rule promulgated in a non-judicial proceeding." Id.
Barnard's interpretation of the Razatos holding does not
withstand scrutiny.

The court in that case distinguished between

rule-making and judicial proceedings. The law simply will not fit
Barnard's attempt to distinguish between the merits and procedure
within a judicial proceeding. The holdings of both Razatos and Van
Sickle are clear: a federal district court is without jurisdiction
to review a state court judicial decision.

The Order which is the

source of Barnard's complaint is just such a judicial decision, and
this Court therefore does not have jurisdiction to hear this case.

Judicial Immunity
Although

we

need

proceed

no

further,

the

Court

will

nevertheless address the issue of judicial immunity. The value to
the courts of being free from harassment by dissatisfied litigants
far outweighs the danger that some wrongs may go unredressed.
stump v, Soarkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).

6

For that reason, "a judge

is entitled to judicial immunity if he has not acted in clear
absence of all jurisdiction and if the act was a judicial one.11
Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985).
Barnard does not argue that Judge Murphy was not acting in his
judicial capacity.

Instead, he cites Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S.

522 (1984) , for the proposition that judicial immunity is not a bar
to an action for injunctive relief.
the law.

Barnard again misinterprets

In Pulliam, the plaintiff sought to enjoin a state

Magistrate from requiring bond for a nonincarcerable offense. The
United States District Court for the District of Utah has already
rejected the application of Pulliam to an action for an injunction
which sought retroactive, rather than prospective, relief. Navajo
Nation v. District Court for Utah County, 624 F.Supp. 130, 137
(D.Utah 1985). The relief sought by Barnard is clearly retroactive
and not prospective, and is therefore barred by judicial immunity.

Wasserman asserts, incorrectly, that the immunity of her codefendant extends to the action against her. The Tenth Circuit has
held that "the immunity of a state official will not necessarily
protect a private individual alleged to have conspired with him."
Shaffer v. Cook, 634 F.2d 1259, 1260 (10th Cir. 1980).

However,

7
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Barnard has alleged no facts sufficient to establish the existence
of a conspiracy between Wasserman and Murphy.

fl

[L]awyers do not

act under color of state law solely by engaging

in private

litigation on behalf of their clients." Id. at 1261 (quoting Brown
v. Chaffee. 612 F.2d 497, 501 (10th Cir. 1979)).

In order to go

forward in the action against her, Barnard must show that Wasserman
reached an understanding with Murphy to deprive Barnard of his
constitutional rights, or that she was a willful participant in a
joint activity with Murphy.
152 (1970).

Adickes v. Kress i Co., 398 U.S. 144,

All Wasserman is alleged to have done is draft a

document embodying the Order of the court.

As the Tenth Circuit

found in Shaffer, "[n]othing in the complaint indicates that the
court or the attorneys were acting outside the confines of the
neutral function of a judicial forum."

634 F.2d at 1260. Barnard

therefore has no cause of action against Wasserman.
THEREFORE, it is
ORDERED that plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.

It is further

ORDERED that defendants1 motion for sanctions bef and the same
hereby is, DENIED.
Dated this

H

day of May^-1990.
Uf
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a n i l i ' JUDGE,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8
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en
United States District Court
for the
District of Utah
May 8, 1990
* * MAILING CERTIFICATE OF CLERK * *
\:

2:89-cv-01042

•ue and correct copies of the attached were mailed by the clerk to the
• llowing:
Brian M. Barnard, Esq.
Utah Legal Clinic
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Craig Peterson, Esq.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Wendy A Faber, Esq.
GIAUQUE, WILCOX & BENDINGER
136 S Main Street, #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Carlie Christensen, Esq.
230 South 500 East Suite 300
Salt Lake City,, UT 84102
Hon. Clarence A. Brimmer
P.O. Box 985
Cheyenne, WY 82001
Markus B. Zimmer, Clerk
U.S. District Court for District
of Utah
350 South Main, Room 204
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2180
(re preparation of judgment)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND-FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
JUDGMENT AND ORDER

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 900903227 CV

ANN L. WASSERMAN,
SHIRLEY RANDAZZO,
and
THE HON. MICHAEL MURPHY,
Judge of the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah,

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.
The above-captioned matter having come before the Court
on Friday, March 22, 1991 at the hour of 8:30 a.m. for
consideration of plaintiff's and defendant, Judge Murphy's crossmotions for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's motion for Judgment
On The Pleadings.

Plaintiff appeared pro se.

Murphy, was represented by Carlie Christensen.

Defendant Judge
Defendant

Randazzo, did not appear in person, nor through her counsel of
record, Ann Wasserman, nor has the defendant Randazzo filed any
response to plaintiff's motions.

The Court having heard and

considered the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the
legal authorities submitted by the parties, and now being fully

,./iO,i:
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BARNARD V WASSERMAN

MEMO DECISION

advised in the premises, makes the following Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1.

This action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section
1983 challenging the constitutionality of a state court
order issued by the Honorable Michael R. Murphy in the
the case of Randazzo v. Randazzo. D-88-4130, a divorce
proceeding filed in the Thrid Judicial District Court,
State of Utah.

2.

Plaintiff, Brian Barnard is an attorney admitted to
practice law in the State of Utah and formerly counsel
for Frank Randazzo, the defendant in the divorce
proceeding in Thrid District Court.

3.

Defendant, Ann Wasserman is also an attorney admitted to
practice law in Utah and counsel for Shirley Randazzo,
the plaintiff in the divorce proceeding in Third
District Court.

4.

Defendant, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy is a duly
appointed and elected judge of the Third Judicial
District Court and presided over the Randazzo case.

5.

On September 13, 1989, at aproximately 3:00 p.m., Judge
Murphy held a hearing on a Motion for a Finding of
Contempt filed by Shirley Randazzo.

Ms. Randazzo's

.ill/
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MEMO DECISION

motion sought to find Frank Randazzo in contempt for
his failure to comply with the terms of the divorce
decree and specifically, his failure to make payments
to Ms. Randazzo7s credit union to keep a loan obligation
current.

Ms. Randazzo and her counsel, Ann Wasserman

were both present at the hearing.
6.

At 4:35 p.m., approximately an hour and a half after the
hearing began, Mr. Randazzo arrived without counsel.
Judge Murphy noted for the record that Mr. Barnard had
previously withdrawn as counsel from the case.

7.

After reviewing the pleadings on file, the proffer of
Ms. Randazzo's counsel and the representations of Mr.
Randazzo, Judge Murphy found that Mr. Randazzo did not
receive notice of the hearing; that his former counsel,
Mr. Barnard did not give Mr. Randazzo timely notice of
the details of the Court's decision as announced on
August 2, 1989; and that Mr. Barnard did not forward
copies of the proposed Findings of Fact and Divorce
Decree to Mr. Randazzo.

8.

Based upon the foregoing, Judge Murphy concluded that
Mr. Randazzo was not in contempt of court and ordered
that the divorce decree be amended to require Mr.
Randazzo to reimburse Ms. Randazzo for all monies
expended by her as a result of Mr. Randazzo's failure

(1(1347
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MEMO DECISION

to keep the credit union loan current, and that Mr.
Randazzo pay to Ms. Randazzo the sum of $4 3 0.00 for
attorney's fees incurred by her in connection with the
contempt proceeding.

Judge Murphy also ordered that

Mr. Randazzo not pay any money to his former counsel
until the award of attorneys' fees was paid to Ms.
Randazzo's counsel and that money paid by Mr. Randazzo
to Ms. Randazzo's counsel be credited, dollar for
dollar against Mr. Randazzo's obligation to Mr.
Barnard.
9.

On September 15, 1989, Ms. Randazzo's counsel mailed a
copy of the proposed order to Mr. Randazzo and Mr.
Barnard.

10.

On or about September 18, 1989, Mr. Barnard filed a
"Motion to Vacate Order of Sanctions and Objection to
Order" and his own affidavit in support of the motion.
On September 20, 1989, Mr. Barnard filed a request for
a hearing.

11.

On October 12, 1989, Judge Murphy signed the proposed
order and directed his clerk, Marlene Bills, to hold
the order pending resolution of Mr. Barnard's
objections.

12.

On November 14, 1989, Mr. Barnard appeared before Judge
Murphy as counsel for defendants in the matter of Ward
v. Butcher, Civil No. C88-4883, a matter unrelated to

MEMO DECISION
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the Randazzo case.

At that time, Ms. Bills advised Mr.

Barnard that Ms. Wasserman was not willing to stipulate
to the entry of an amended order in the Randazzo matter
and asked whether he wanted to schedule a hearing on
his objections.

Mr. Barnard advised Ms. Bills to file

the order and that he would "take care of it another
way".

Based upon Mr. Barnard's representations, Ms.

Bills issued a minute entry indicating that Mr. Barnard
did not intend to have a hearing on his objections and
that Judge Murphy's order of October 12, 1989 would be
filed.
13.

Approximately one week later, on November 21, 1989,
Judge Murphy held a scheduling conference in the matter
of Ward v. Butcher.

At that time, Judge Murphy

inquired of Mr. Barnard whether Judge Murphy was named
as a defendant in the matter of Barnard v. Wasserman
and if so, whether Judge Murphy could continue to
preside over the Ward case.

Mr. Barnard indicated that

unless there was a resolution to the Randazzo case, Mr.
Barnard would be compelled to file a lawsuit.
14.

Judge Murphy then swore his clerk, Marlene Bills,
and asked her to testify as to whether a hearing had
been scheduled in the Randazzo matter.

Ms. Bills

testified as follows:

00345
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I told Mr. Barnard if Ann wasn't willing to amend
the findings and Order, and if he wanted to
schedule a hearing, that was fine. He indicated
to me, "Go ahead and file then, because I'll just
take care of it in Federal Court." After that, I
filed the signed Findings of Fact and Order, and
left it at that. I had been holding the papers
for — well, since the 12th, when they were
signed. And had been holding them and had not
filed them until that day.
Brian Barnard was then sworn and testified as follows:
The conversation that your clerk related to you
is correct, except for one particular, and that
is I didn't make any reference to Federal Court
at all. I said, "Go ahead and file it. I'll
take care of it in another way."
I also told her that I would take an S.O.B. pill
and go after Ann Wasserman, because I didn't like
the way Ann Wasserman had treated me. And she
commented in a joking manner, back to me.
Based upon Mr. Barnard's representations, Judge Murphy
disqualified himself from further proceedings in the
Ward matter.
On February 9, 1990, plaintiff filed suit against Judge
Murphy in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah challenging the constitutionality of
the state court order issued by Judge Murphy in the
Randazzo case.
On May 4, 1990, the Hon. Clarence Brimmer, the Chief
Judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Wyoming, sitting by designation, ordered that
plaintiff's claims be dismissed for lack of subject

BARNARD V WASSERMAN
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matter jurisidiction.

Judge Brimmer also found that

the relief sought by plaintiff was barred by the
doctrine of judicial immunity•
19.

On May 31, 1990, plaintiff filed this action in the
Third District Court against the same parties and
based upon the same legal theories as the federal
action which he filed.

On July 17, 1990, Judge Murphy

accepted service of the summons and complaint.
20.

Defendant Shirley Randazzo has not filed any
responsive pleadings to plaintiff's motions.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

1.

That this action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 challenging the constitutionality of a
state court order issued by the Honorable Michael R.
Murphy in the case of Randazzo v. Randazzo, D-88-4130,
a divorce proceeding filed in the Third Judicial
District Court, State of Utah.

That the plaintiff in

this action is seeking attorneys' fees and costs
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988.
2.

That judges are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983 for acts committed within their judicial capacity.

3.

That a judge has acted in his judicial capacity if he
has not acted in the clear absence of all jurisdicition

;.fiocr -•
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and if the act is a judicial one.

MEMO DECISION

Stump v. Sparkman,

435 U.S. 34, reh. den.. 436 U.S. 951 (1978).
4.

That an act is a judicial act if it is a function
normally performed by a judge and the parties dealt
with the judge in his official capacity.

Martinez v.

Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985)
5.

That Judge Murphy's conduct consisted solely of
conducting a hearing and signing and entering an order.
That such conduct is consistent with the conduct
normally engaged in by judges of the District Court.

6.

That the plaintiffs dealings with Judge Murphy were
limited exclusively to actions performed by Judge
Murphy in his judicial capacity.

That plaintiff had

no extra-judicial contact with Judge Murphy or dealt
with the District Court in any other capacity than
as an attorney.

That the conduct in question

consisted solely of normal judicial functions in a case
pending before Judge Murphy and arose from dealings with
the judge in his official capacity.
7.

That Judge Murphy's actions were judicial acts.

Stump

v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 34, reh. den.. 436 U.S. 951
(1978); Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th
Cir. 1985).
8.

That the test for determining the application of the

V. WASSERMAN
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doctrine of judicial immunity is whether there is a
clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject
matter and not whether the judge committed procedural
errors.

Stump v. Soarkman. 435 U.S. 349 (1978);

Bradley v. Fisher. 13 Wall. 335 (1872).
That the District Court has subject matter jurisdiction
over contempt proceedings involving attorneys who
willfully neglect or violate their duty.

Utah Code

Ann. Sections 78-3-4 and 78-32-1.
That Judge Murphy had subject matter jurisdiction over
the contempt proceedings against plaintiff for his
alleged neglect in failing to inform his client of his
responsibilities under the divorce decree.
That any defects in the contempt procedures employed by
Judge Murphy in the Randazzo case will not support a
conclusion that there was a clear absence of all
jurisdiction.

Stump v Sparkman. 435 U.S. 349 (1978);

Rolleston v. Eldriae, 848 F.2d 163 (11th Cir. 1988);
and Williams v. Sepe. 487 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1973).
That Judge Murphy was acting in his judicial capacity
at the time of the alleged wrongful conduct, that all
of his actions were judicial ones and that he did not
act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.
That judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective

0(1353
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injunctive relief against a judicial officer.

Pulliam

v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
14.

That plaintiff's request for injunctive and declaratory
relief in the present case is simply an attempt to
obtain the review and reversal of a state court order.
Navajo Nation v. District Court for Utah County, 624
F. Supp. 130 (D. Utah, 1985).

15.

That plaintiff's request for injunctive and declaratory
relief is clearly retroactive and not prospective.
Barnard v. Murphy, Civil No. 89-C-1042-B, Order on
Motions for Summary Judgment (D. Utah, 1990).

16.

That plaintiff's request for injunctive and declaratory
relief does not fall within the exceptional language
contained in Pulliam.

17.

That plaintiff's claims are therefore barred by the
doctrine of judicial immunity.

18.

That the fundamental requirement of due process of law
is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380

U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
19.

That the presumption against a claimed waiver of
constitutional rights can be overcome upon a showing of
a valid waiver.

Pitts v. Board of Education of U.S.D.

305. Salina. Kansas, 869 F.2d 555, 557 (10th Cir.
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1989); Johnnson v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 734
F.2d 774, 784 (11th Cir. 1984).
20.

That the determination as to whether a valid waiver
exists depends upon whether there was an intentional
abandonment or relinquishment of a known right.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Edwards
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981).

21.

That a determination as to whether there was an
intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a known
right, in turn, depends upon whether the party
understood his rights, and whether he knowingly and
voluntarily waived them.

Ostlund v. Bob, 825 F.2d

1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987); Sassower v. Sheriff of
Westchester Co.. 824 F.2d 184, 190 (2nd Cir. 1987).
22.

That plaintiff understood that he had the right to be
heard inasmuch as he filed a written request for a
hearing.

23.

That plaintiff voluntarily waived that right when he
advised Judge Murphy's clerk to enter the order and
informed her that he would "take care of it in another
way".

24.

That plaintiff knowingly waived that right inasmuch as
plaintiff is an attorney who practices extensively in
the area of civil rights litigation, that he is
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informed about individual constitutional rights and the
consequences of waiving those rights, and that he is
retained by others to offer his professional judgment
on the exercise and waiver of those rights.
That plaintiff's direction to Judge Murphy's clerk to
enter the order and his statement that he would "take
care of it in another way" were made with the
understanding and knowledge that he would not recieve a
hearing prior to the entry of the order.
That once a state has provided a procedure for
remedying a perceived wrong, a civil rights complainant
is obligated to avail himself of those remedies, and if
the complainant's due process rights are waived.
Weinrauch v. Park Citv, 751 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir.
1984); Riggins v. Board of Regents of the University
of Nebraska. 790 F.2d 707, 712 (8th Cir. 1986); and
Jacobus v. Hevdiner, 643 F.Supp. 550 (S.D.W.Va. 1986).
That plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to be heard
on his objections to the order and to remedy the
perceived wrong, that plaintiff was obligated to avail
himself of that remedy, and that plaintiff's decision
not to utilize the procedure offered constitutes a
waiver of plaintiff's due process rights.
That where a state can feasibly provide a pre-
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deprivation hearing before taking a constitutionally
protected property or liberty interest, it generally
must do so regardless of the adequacy of the postdeprivation remedy.

Zinermon v. Burch,

U.S.

,

110 S.Ct. 975 (1990).
29.

That plaintiff was not deprived of a constitutionally
protected interest by the signing of Judge Murphy's
October 12, 1989 order.

30.

That it was the entry of Judge Murphy's order which
gave rise to the alleged deprivation of plaintiff's
property and liberty interests.

31.

That until Judge Murphy entered the order, its contents
were not a matter of public record nor was Shirley
Randazzo, the plaintiff in the Third District Court
divorce proceeding, able to enforce it.

32.

That plaintiff was not deprived of any property
interest or liberty interest in his name and reputation
until the order was entered.

33.

That plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to be heard
on his objections prior to the entry of Judge Murphy's
order.

34.

That it was plaintiff's own direction to Judge Murphy's
clerk to enter Judge Murphy's order, that resulted in
its entry without further hearing.
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That plaintiff did not suffer any deprivation of a
constitutionally protected interest until Judge Murphy
entered his order; that plaintiff had the opportunity,
prior to the entry of that order, to be heard on his
objections; that said opportunity constituted a predeprivation remedy consistent with Zinermon and was
constitutionally sufficient and that plaintiff waived
that opportunity.

ORDER

1.

Plaintiffs motion for Summary Judgment against
defendant Shirley Randazzo is granted.

The motion is

unopposed.
2.

Defendants' motion for Summary Judgment against
plaintiff is granted on the doctrines of Judicial
Immunity, Res Judicata and Waiver.

3.

All other pending motions are denied as moot.
Dated this

^

day of April, 1991.

PAT B. BRIAN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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